Games » Arizona Diamondbacks
Jun22Ninth-inning breakdown
Lee Judge
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Down by one run, bottom of the ninth inning, two outs and Chris Getz came to the plate to face J.J. Putz. You often will see Chris take a pitch or two when he’s just trying to get on base, but Putz was getting it up there in a hurry (he topped out at 97 mph last night) and has a “put-away splitter.” Chris has told me you can’t afford to take what may be the only hittable pitch from a dominant closer, so Chris was hacking.
Chris fouled off three straight fastballs then finally got the splitter he had been dreading. So of course he got an infield single off of it. (I’ve suggested to Chris that he’s at his best when he doesn’t actually hit the ball all the way to a fielder … and he kind of agrees.) So now Chris was on first, representing the tying run with Melky Cabrera at the plate.
The Diamondbacks starter, Ian Kennedy, got the ball to the plate in 1.1 seconds, so he was able to shut down the Royals running game. Putz, like many closers, doesn’t worry so much about the running game and just concentrates on the hitter. Which is probably why he gets the ball home in 1.7 seconds. I think they time him with a sundial. With those numbers, second base was almost a lock, so Chris took off, stole it easily, and the tying run was now in scoring position.
With two outs, many ballplayers would have stayed put. The run was already a hit away, so why go to third?
First base was open, and even though Melky respresented the game-winning run, the Diamondbacks didn’t appear that intent on throwing strikes to him. Their thinking was to put the veteran on base if he won’t chase and go after the rookie, Eric Hosmer. Chris saw what was happening and figured that if he could steal third (remember that 1.7 time home), that would open second base. And with Melky on first, the Diamondbacks would have to hold him on. And that would give Hosmer, a left-handed hitter, a hole to hit through when he came to the plate.
(I’m sure there are some knuckleheads playing who have no idea how many outs there are, but for the most part, when you get to talk to big-league players you’re impressed with their thought processes.)
So Chis takes off, and Putz gets lucky and shortens his delivery on that pitch. The play at third was closer than he intended, but Chris was safe. So the Diamondbacks walked Melky, and Royals manager Ned Yost sent Jarrod Dyson out to pinch-run for Melky and steal the base. Ned said he thought Melky could steal it, but he was sure Dyson would.
So Dyson took off, and Hosmer hacked at the first pitch and popped it up. Game over. The best-laid plans of mice and men, etc.. After the game, Ned said Eric made a big mistake by hacking at the first pitch with Dyson running. Yost wanted Eric to take a pitch, get the winning run in scoring position and then go to hitting.
Hosmer wasn’t on the same page. His thought process was, “Don’t get greedy. Get the game tied up by driving in the runner on third, and don’t fall behind to Putz and his put-away slider.” Getz was thinking open a hole for Eric. Ned was going to close the hole by having Dyson steal.
Either thought process seems fine, but everyone probably ought to be on the same page.
There’s a reason I called this thing a “ninth-inning breakdown.”
Two instances of heads-up base running
Chris Getz went from first to third in the third inning because he took a look around. He saw that the Arizona right fielder was slightly in the gap, so when the ball was hit to his left, Chris knew that Justin Upton would be moving laterally and away from third. That meant a weak throw. It’s this kind of thinking that separates the people who play ahead of the game from the people who always seem to be a step behind.
Chris’ base running meant he got to third and was able to score on Hosmer’s double-play groundball that followed.
Alex Gordon got points for heads-up base running for not advancing a base. He was on second, the ball was hit sharply to his right, and he froze to check the shortstop. A lot of runners screw this up. They take off hard for a couple of steps, then realize that the shortstop has the ball. A ball hit in front of the runner at second with no force has to clear the infield before the runner can head to third base. (You can see Royals third-base coach Eddie Rodriguez remind runners of that by lifting his left arm and pointing under it with his right forefinger. That means “make the ball go through.”) It’s amazing how many times you see big-leaguers mess this up.
How to see a baseball
They have been playing this game a long time, and some pretty smart guys have figured out the best way to do everything, including seeing a baseball. Seeing the ball is the most important part of hitting, and hitters often will take it for granted and then pay the price.
So how do you see a baseball?
When a hitter is waiting in his stance, you almost always see some small motion. Waving the bat, swaying, anything to keep the body in motion. It’s like a car idling before it takes off. At that point, the hitter is in broad focus. He’s looking out at the pitcher and not focusing on anything in particular.
Once the pitcher starts his windup, the hitter goes into fine focus. This involves taking a deep breath, which gives the brain a fresh shot of oxygen, and shifting the eyes to the window, which is the expected release point for the pitch. Tony Gwynn was so good at this he could see the grip the pitcher was using to throw the ball. (I tried the same thing and saw an interesting collection of blurs.)
When a hitter says he was picking up the ball well, he means he was seeing the release point and tracking the ball all the way. If you miss the release point or don’t focus soon enough, the ball will appear to jump on you more quickly. And that brings us to Joakim Soria.
Watch Soria’s windup, and you’ll see him slide the ball up his side, out of sight of the hitter. Soria also will use his body to shield the hitter’s view of his glove. Joakim doesn’t want to tip any pitches by something he does with his free hand or glove, so he keeps everything out of sight for as long as possible.
Once again, watching Soria’s windup is instructive. The hitter does not see the ball until late in Joakim’s delivery, and that disrupts the fine focus the hitter needs to see a ball well. It’s why hitters react as if Soria is throwing the ball harder than he is. They see it late, and that makes them react late.
I can tell you how to see a baseball. Soria will show you how hard it can be.
Francis
Getz
Hosmer
Is it my imagination or do Royals pitchers tend to give up runs in chunks while the offense generates them in small bites? Ties in with the Hoch and Davies discussions, but there seems to be a pattern developing.
I hope Dayton reads this, as Hosmer cannot be expected to be a mind reader. If Yost wants him to take the first pitch, then he needs to give the sign. And Getz raises a great point, whether it is better to get the winning run on 2B, or to open up a hole for Hoz to hit through. I am not sure of the answer to that, but wonder if it even crossed Yost's mind. And I don't like Yost's quote (I know he is Foxworthy's friend, but still) that Hoch has to figure it out. How about a little help from the pitching coach and the manager instead of just throwing him under the bus. I think that Seitz has proven he is a good hitting coach but, given much more time to do so, McClure's results do not look good. Hoch and Davies are still floundering on the mound, while Alex and Alcides have turned it around at the plate.
Hey Lee, I have a question about the squeeze play. AZ pulled it off last night and it made me wonder:
What are the main points of thought when a manger decides to put on a safety squeeze? And what is different about those points that would make him decide to try a suicide squeeze instead? It seems that it may be a complicated decision - or that I'm over-thinking it.
The squeeze play is one of my favorites in the game... and when I see a guy on third (and no outs) I'm anxious to see it happen; but it usually doesn't. I figured that since you're so close to the staff there that you may know or be able to find out.
Michael: You probably won't see a squeeze with no outs. With a runner on third and nobody down, the offense has two chances to get the run in without a hit. (Maybe you'd see it in the NL with the pitcher at the plate, but even then, it's unusual.)
So the thinking is: take your chances with the first out and if it doesn't happen then, try a squeeze. So if you want to see that play it will generally happen with one down.
The suicide requires two players to be on the same page and if they haven't done it much, they're at a disadvantage. (National League teams have this advantage in inter-league play, their pitchers have done this stuff.)
The timing on the start of the suicide is when the pitcher's foot comes down. If the batter squares too soon or the runner breaks too quickly, the pitcher will throw up and in on a righty, dumping the hitter and clearing the play for the catcher.
If it's a lefty at the plate (which would also be unusual because the catcher will have a clear view of the runner breaking, but I've seen it done) and the pitcher recognizes the play, he'll pitch out.
The offense also has to be convinced the pitcher is going to throw a strike. The suicide requires a very good bunter: you're planning on him protecting the runner coming home. That runner doesn't have to be a whippet. If the bunt is good, he'll often score standing up.
The safety is the opposite: the bunter doesn't have to be as good because the runner isn't coming until he sees the ball down, but that runner has to be quick and decisive.
He can trail the third baseman in without fear: short will cover second and second will cover first when the corners crash. Once first, third, or pitcher pick the ball up and go to first, the runner breaks for home.
I haven't asked Ned about this, but you bring up an interesting point so I will. I would think the Royals would be more likely to run the safety if it's a pitcher at the plate (although Francis is supposed to be a good bunter), because there's less pressure to get the bunt down.
So to wrap up: one down, good bunter or pitcher at the plate, a count that makes you believe a strike is coming and a score that makes the run important. That's when you might see this play.
Steve: Getz was on his own when he stole third. The big factor in his mind was the slow delivery time. He figured why not take advantage and give Hosmer a slightly better chance?
I agree that Hosmer and Ned needed to be on the same page and I imagine that will get talked about today. Ned meets with the media first and then we go into the clubhouse. I don't think anybody realized they weren't on the same page until we talked to Eric and by then Ned was unavailable.
As for McClure: there's a couple ways to look at this. If Mac is giving them the right game plan, but the pitchers can't execute, is it Mac's fault?
The other view is even if Mac is telling them the right stuff (and I'm sure he is, they don't give those jobs to dopes), but he can't get the message through, do you need a change in the messenger?
Having said that I didn't really see last night as a pitching problem. When the staff gives up three runs or less you should be able to win those game.
On the offensive side there were several times they had runs in scoring position and hit the ball hard, but didn't get the job done. Frenchy smoked one to short with Alex on second (the play I talked about earlier), Moose hit a shot down the line that the first baseman knocked down and that kept a runner from scoring.
They are going through one of those snake-bit periods, although one of the coaches told me that good teams find a way to win those game.
They're barely short of winning, but consistently barely short of winning.
The Royals (except for our starting pitching) seem close to becoming a really good team. Hopefully, we can hang in with them as they work to get over the hump. It's okay to be critical, but let's not go over the top in our anxiety to see the end result.
The Royals could only be so lucky as to find out their problem is the pitching coach. If there is a cat out there who can coach them from the the pitching cellar to mediocrity then bring him in. But I'm guessing they're getting about as much from this rotation as we can expect. This isn't Halladay, Oswalt, Lee and Hamels that McClure is working with.
I like the way Getz was thinking. Makes you wonder if he'll consider coaching somewhere down the line. Out of curiosity Lee, who do you find to have the highest Baseball IQs on the Royals?
There are a lot of candidates: Getz obviously comes to mind. Jason Kendall is one of the smartest guys you'll ever know. Treanor is up there (catchers usually are). Francoeur understands leadership and how to motivate. There are a lot of guys who seem like they might end up coaching.
Lee, thanks for the squeeze info... now that you've laid it out - it makes perfect sense.
Hmmm, I wonder if your articles are on scouts' radar... if Ned tells you in what situations he'd call for a squeeze play, I doubt that he would want the opposition to know? :) So if you don't post it, no worries from me. I'll just be patient and look for it on a 3-1 count when Paulino's up tonight :)
Michael: Thanks. Everytime I had this stuff explained to me I had the same reaction: that makes perfect sense.
That's part of what's so appealing about baseball, it's so logical (most of the time).
Ned probably doesn't worry about the scouts reading my stuff, they're waaay ahead of me and have recorded his tendencies already.
And if it's 3-1, they'll probably hope Paulino walks, but 0-0 (if the guy's throwing a lot of first pitch strikes), 1-0 2-0 and 2-1 are good bets.
(Now watch them do it with no outs and a 3-0 count.)